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No antitrust lawyer, industrial organization economist, or regula-
tor should fail to read John Lott's book, Are Predatory Commitments
Credible?: Who Should the Courts Believe? It is a provocative and sig-
nificant contribution to the antitrust literature. As the book's subtitle
suggests, the work is intended to shape antitrust law in the most prac-
tical sense by influencing the decisions that courts render in predation
cases. Lott disputes economists who have employed game theory over
the past two decades to lend plausibility to the assertion that preda-
tion is a serious concern. He endeavors to rebut them both theoreti-
cally and empirically. In the process, he produces a provocative hy-
pothesis: while predation by private enterprises is implausible, preda-
tion by public enterprises is not.
There is much to applaud in Lott's book, but it is not flawless. A
recurring limitation is that Lott's creative empirical tests yield results
that can support interpretations other than the ones that Lott offers.
We find Lott's book to be more successful in pointing out the likeli-
hood of predatory pricing by public enterprises than in proving that
predatory pricing by private enterprises does not occur. Moreover,
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with respect to predation by public enterprises, Lott does not develop
the economic and legal implications of his thesis in detail. Some of the
relevant analysis may exceed the scope of Lott's concise book, but ad-
ditional analysis along some of the dimensions described below would
have strengthened Lott's important insights. Despite these limitations,
Are Predatory Commitments Credible? advances significantly the legal
and economic understanding of predatory pricing.
In Part I of this Review, we critique Lott's theoretical and empiri-
cal attempts to show that predatory pricing by private firms is implau-
sible. Our discussion covers three topics. First, we review the theoreti-
cal arguments regarding the plausibility of predation by private firms.
Second, we critique Lott's empirical research on the credibility of
predatory commitments by private firms. Lott's research tests the hy-
pothesis that predatory firms should adopt different employment and
management compensation policies from those adopted by nonpreda-
tory firms. Third, we assess Lott's theoretical analysis of the effects of
allowing would-be victims of predation to benefit directly from their
privileged knowledge of a predator's intended activities, as, for exam-
ple, when the victim short sells the stock of the predator.I Such short
selling can enable the victim to gain financially from the sacrifice in
profit that the predator incurs when it predates, and may thereby en-
courage the victim to persist in its struggle against the predator.
A consistent theme emerges in these sections. Lott's observations
are insightful and provocative. However, because he does not model
the phenomena of interest carefully in each case, it is often difficult to
infer the exact merits of Lott's arguments and how broadly his insights
apply. Furthermore, although Lott's empirical work is creative and
suggestive, it is not definitive.
In Part II, we assess Lott's theoretical and empirical analyses of
predatory pricing by public enterprises. We first emphasize the practi-
cal importance of these analyses, both in the United States and abroad
where state-owned enterprises are prevalent. Then, we examine Lott's
attempt to test empirically whether public enterprises have a greater
propensity to undertake predatory pricing than private firms. Again,
we find Lott's empirical findings provocative but not definitive.
In Part III, we present, as a proposed research agenda for schol-
ars in law and economics, important unanswered questions that extend
Lott's research on predatory pricing by public enterprises. The rele-
vant legal questions encompass such diverse issues as the proper
scope of antitrust law, sovereign immunity, and Chevron deference for
A short sale is the sale of a security that the investor has borrowed rather than owns. See
Stephen A. Ross, Randolph W. Westerfield, and Jeffrey Jaffe, Corporate Finance 866 (Irwin
McGraw-Hill 5th ed 1999).
' Chevron USA, Inc v Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc, 467 US 837, 842-45 (1984)
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regulatory decisions by a government enterprise regarding the scope
of its own privileges and immunities from competition. In addition, we
explain how Lott's analyses can be formalized and extended to ana-
lyze the likely incidence of predatory pricing by public enterprises and
the exact patterns in which it is likely to appear. We also ask what
policies might be pursued to limit undesirable predation by public en-
terprises, and discuss some drawbacks to standard legal and regulatory
policies.
I. PREDATION BY PRIVATE FIRMS
A central question in antitrust jurisprudence and scholarship is
whether, as a theoretical matter, predatory pricing is a rational strat-
egy for a firm to undertake. A related question is whether, as an em-
pirical matter, predatory pricing ever actually occurs. Lott argues on
both theoretical and empirical grounds that private firms cannot
credibly engage in successful predatory pricing.
Curiously, however, Lott never provides a clear definition of
predatory pricing; he only hints at a definition halfway through Are
Predatory Commitments Credible? (p 64). Even then, Lott does not
provide the Supreme Court's own articulation of the test for preda-
tory pricing, which would seem pertinent to a book that endeavors to
advise courts on whom they should believe about predation. In Car-
(holding that, when interpreting a statute that an agency administers and the statute is silent or
ambiguous with respect to the issue in question, a court must defer to the agency's construction
of the statute if it is reasonable).
' For an introduction to the debate, see Paul L. Joskow and Alvin K. Klevorick, A Frame-
work for Analyzing Predatory Pricing Policy, 89 Yale L J 213 (1979) (proposing a two-tier test
courts could use to evaluate predation claims); Oliver E. Williamson, Predatory Pricing:A Strate-
gic and Welfare Analysis, 87 Yale L J 284 (1977) (arguing that, when firm behavior is considered
over time, predatory pricing is a viable strategy because predatory firms will be able to establish
a credible predatory commitment, deter potential entrants, and recoup losses); Phillip E. Areeda
and Donald E Ibrner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman
Act, 88 Harv L Rev 697 (1975) (concluding (1) that sales below reasonably anticipated short-run
marginal costs or average variable costs should be deemed predatory pricing, and (2) that preda-
tory pricing is unlikely to succeed or be tried because a predatory firm will not be able to recoup
its losses in most cases). See also Phillip E. Areeda and Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law: 1999
Supplement 224-30 (Aspen 1999) (reporting recent judicial discussion of predatory pricing).
. It is worth noting that predation may take many forms other than predatory pricing, such
as misleading advertising about a competitor's product, cutting off supply of an essential input,
designing interfaces for complementary products in a way that produces incompatibility for a ri-
val, or initiating excessive regulatory hearings and/or lawsuits. If these forms of nonprice preda-
tion constitute more effective means of eliminating competition than predatory pricing, as Judge
Robert Bork and others have argued, then we might not expect to see much predatory pricing in
practice. For discussion of these nonprice methods of predation, see Robert H. Bork, The Anti-
trust Paradox'A Policy at War with Itself 347-64 (Free Press rev ed 1993); William J. Baumol and
Janusz A. Ordover, Use of Antitrust to Subvert Competition, 28 J L & Econ 247 (1985). This issue
deserves more than the limited attention that Lott affords it.
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gill, Inc v Monfort of Colorado, lnc; in 1986, the Supreme Court de-
fined predatory pricing as "pricing below an appropriate measure of
cost for the purpose of eliminating competitors in the short run and
reducing competition in the long run., 6 Seven years later, the Court
clarified in Brooke Group Ltd v Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp7
that a claim of predatory pricing requires the plaintiff to prove that
prices "are below an appropriate measure of its rival's cost" and that
the alleged predator has "a reasonable prospect, or, under § 2 of the
Sherman Act, a dangerous probability [ ] of recouping its investment
in below-cost prices."8 The Court, however, has never supplied a spe-
cific definition of "cost." 9 Obviously, the answer to Lott's question of
whether "predatory pricing" is credible will depend significantly on
what measure of cost one uses to define the term. It is unfortunate,
therefore, that Lott does not address this potential source of confusion
at the very beginning of his book.
A. The Credibility of Predatory Commitments by Private Firms
Chapter 1 of Are Predatory Commitments Credible? provides an
expeditious summary of the literature on predatory pricing. Lawyers
and economists in the Chicago School of antitrust analysis have ar-
gued that the predator's difficulty in recouping the losses that result
from pricing below some appropriate measure of marginal (or average
incremental) cost makes predatory pricing an inherently inefficacious
and unattractive strategy. Even if predatory pricing could force com-
peting firms to exit, in any market that does not require significant
sunk costs for entry, the predator cannot prevent entry during the
post-predation phase, when the predator seeks to raise its price to su-
pracompetitive levels.'° That result may hold even in the presence of
sunk costs if the firm exiting the market can sell its capacity to a sub-
sequent entrant." Thus, predatory pricing would seem to be irrational
5 479 US 104 (1986).
6 Id at 117.
509 US 209 (1993).
Id at 222,224.
Id at 222-23 & n 1; Cargill, 479 US at 117-18 n 12.
See Bork, The Antitrust Paradox at 144-59 (cited in note 4) (reviewing literature). For ap-
plications of this idea to antitrust law, see Yale Brozen, Concentration, Mergers and Public Policy
162-64, 386-92 (Macmillan 1982) (arguing that the Chicago view has been persuasive among
scholars); Frank H. Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U Chi L Rev 263,
263-64 (1981) (concluding that courts and the law should not take predation charges seriously);
Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Law:An Economic Perspective 184-96 (Chicago 1976) (arguing that
predatory strategies can at best delay entry); Lester Telser, Cutthroat Competition and the Long
Purse, 9 J L & Econ 259 (1966) (arguing that firms can more easily pursue monopolization by
merger and acquisition than by predation).
" See Paul W. MacAvoy, The Failure of Antitrust and Regulation to Establish Competition in
Long-Distance Telephone Services 190 (MIT and AEI 1996) (arguing that "predatory pricing in
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as a theoretical matter not only in markets with small sunk costs, but
also in markets with large sunk costs associated with investments in
durable capacity that are not highly firm-specific. The Chicagoans fur-
ther predict that competitors will understand the weakness in a preda-
tor's position and adopt their own defensive strategies predicated on
the belief that the predator could not credibly commit itself to a path
of sustained losses from uncompensatory pricing. 2 Much empirical
work supports this view. Indeed, even Phillip Areeda and Donald
Turner, both professors at Harvard rather than Chicago, observed in
their famous Harvard Law Review article of 1975 that "proven cases
of predatory pricing have been extremely rare."'
3
This skepticism toward predatory pricing is not shared by all
economists.14 Economists have employed game-theoretic models to
show that pricing below cost may be rational because of signaling ef-
fects and that the sequential bankruptcies of multiple competitors,
which the Chicago School powerfully argued are neither plausible nor
observed, are unnecessary for successful predatory intimidation.'
Whatever the merits of their arguments, however, the game theorists
have, to date, failed to convince the courts. In 1993, for example, Alvin
Klevorick surveyed the game-theoretic economic literature on preda-
tion and found that courts had yet to consider it.'6 The current body of
predatory pricing jurisprudence, epitomized by the Supreme Court's
decisions in Matsushita Electric Industries Co v Zenith Radio Corp"
the interLATA market could not produce a monopoly," because "[e]ven if a Bell operating com-
pany could bankrupt one or more of the three major interexchange carriers, that carrier's fiber
optic capacity would remain intact for another to purchase"); Daniel F Spulber and J. Gregory
Sidak, Deregulatory Takings and the Regulatory Contract: The Competitive Transformation of
Network Industries in the United States 92-94 (Cambridge 1997) (reviewing evidence that this is
true of the telecommunications industry).
" See Easterbrook, 48 U Chi L Rev at 285-88,293-94 (cited in note 10) (noting, for exam-
ple, that entrants may sign long-term contracts with customers making them invulnerable to
predators' price cuts).
Areeda and Turner, 88 Harv L Rev at 718 (cited in note 3).
Indeed, even the skepticism among Chicago-oriented scholars should not be equated with
a dogmatic belief among them that successful predation never occurs. See, for example, Dennis
W. Carlton and Michael Waldman, The Strategic Use of Tying to Preserve and Create Market
Power in Evolving Industries, Working Paper No 145, George J. Stigler Center for the Study of
the Economy and the State, University of Chicago (July 1999) (arguing that monopolists may be
able to use product tying and foreclosure to deter entry of efficient firms and help the monopo-
list recoup losses from predatory pricing); Thomas W. Hazlett, Predation in Local Cable TV
Markets, 40 Antitrust Bull 609 (1995) (presenting a case study of successful predation).
By setting low prices, a firm may be able to signal to its imperfectly informed rivals that its
costs are low. By convincing its rivals that they face a particularly formidable competitor, the
firm can induce its rivals to exit the industry. For a review and analysis of the relevant literature,
see, for example, Jean 'lirole, The Theory of Industrial Organization 361 (MIT 1989).
" Alvin K. Klevorick, The Current State of the Law and Economics of Predatory Pricing, 83
Am Econ Rev Papers & Proc 162 (1993).
" 475 US 574,589 (1986) ("[P]redatory schemes are rarely tried and even more rarely suc-
cessful.").
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and Brooke,'8 embraces the skepticism of the Chicago School. Preda-
tory pricing is, in the Court's view, rarely attempted and even more
rarely successful.
Lott is sympathetic to that conclusion. He observes, correctly, that
game-theoretic models of predation can explain almost any phe-
nomenon (pp 2-6). This fact may constitute a legitimate drawback to
such models. Their strength, however, is that they force the researcher
to make explicit all assumptions that are being made about the envi-
ronment in question. A reader can then assess readily whether the
maintained assumptions are appropriate for the situation under con-
sideration. Game-theoretic models also provide a convenient vehicle
for proving carefully all assertions that are made. By failing to present
his arguments using fully specified game-theoretic models, Lott unfor-
tunately fails to make his own assumptions clear. Consequently, Are
Predatory Commitments Credible? often leaves the reader to try to
surmise the conditions under which Lott's assertions are valid. Several
examples of this problem are discussed below.
B. Lott's Empirical Investigation of the Credibility of Predatory
Commitments by Private Firms
Lott's attempt to test predation theories empirically should be
applauded for its creativity and originality. Lott hypothesizes that a
firm's predatory commitments will be credible only if its managers are
given incentives "to expand output at the expense of accounting prof-
its" (p 19) and if they cannot easily be removed by shareholders dur-
ing the predatory period. Lott then surveys the experiences of eighty-
five firms sued for predation to see whether they had decoupled man-
ager compensation from short-term profit or entrenched their manag-
ers in some fashion. 9 He finds that they did not. Rather, "[m]anagers
of firms accused of predation were rewarded more for increasing
short-term profits in predation years than were other managers ....
(p 43). Nor were such managers more entrenched (p 56).
The primary weakness in Lott's approach is that he assumes
predatory commitments must take the form of managerial incentives
without considering alternative forms. Much of the game-theoretic lit-
erature on predation of the 1980s and 1990s built on the work of Stan-
ford economists Paul Milgrom and John Roberts.' Accordingly, Lott
509 US at 225-26 (affirming the test applied in Matsushita).
Though it is unlikely that all these firms were guilty of predatory acts, Lott assumes that
they were more likely to be guilty than most firms. One would therefore expect to find that their
management compensation and job security differed systematically from most firms if the game
theoretic model is valid.
Paul Milgrom and John Roberts, Predation, Reputation and Entry Deterrence, 27 J Econ
Theory 280 (1982).
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addresses the Milgrom-Roberts model. In particular, Lott interprets
the model to require that potential competitors believe that the
predator is not interested in maximizing profit. Lott's interpretation of
that model, however, may be too literal and may overlook other pos-
sible interpretations (pp 18-27). 2' Entrants may simply be uncertain
about the predator's cost function.n
Lott does not present a formal model to justify his assertion that
predatory firms would be expected to compensate managers differ-
ently from the manner in which nonpredatory firms do. Without the
formal model, it is difficult to test whether the assertion is true. Lott
hypothesizes that the shareholders of predatory firms that support a
predatory strategy would be tolerant of managers who sacrificed
profit in the short term and would punish managers if competitive en-
try were to occur (contrary to those managers' efforts to establish a
reputation for toughness) (p 20). But it is not clear why these share-
holders should necessarily want to fire a manager when entry occurs.
Firing the manager is optimal when evidence of incompetence or
shirking arises. Competitive entry is not necessarily a sign of either.2
Incentive structures that pay managers more as profits fall might well
be interpreted by the courts as evidence of predatory pricing. This fact
alone may preclude the use of such incentive structures, even if preda-
tion is taking place. Moreover, Lott ignores the role of the labor mar-
ket in affecting managers' incentives. Even if a manager is paid a fixed
wage, he may choose to act as a vicious predator if doing so will make
him more highly valued by other potential employers who seek a
manager to conduct predatory pricing.
As a general proposition empirical work is seldom definitive, and
for a variety of reasons, that is certainly the case here, as Lott recog-
nizes:
[O]ne must be careful in interpreting the evidence provided later
... showing that firms accused of predation neither provided ac-
cused predatory managers with additional protection from re-
moval nor provided them with compensation that encourages
predatory behavior. Two interpretations are possible: either that
Lott's own discussion appears to concede that his focus on the early Milgrom-Roberts
reputation model may not be entirely appropriate (p 27). That concession, however, does not
seem to affect the design of his empirical tests.
See note 15.
More generally, observed performance is seldom a perfect measure of unobserved behav-
ior or ability. Consequently, the ideal relationship between performance and compensation is dif-
ficult to specify in general. See, for example, Bengt Holmstrom, Moral Hazard and Observability,
10 Bell J Econ 74 (1989). Furthermore, if entry always led to dismissal of the manager, the en-
trant might be particularly inclined to enter when it knows the manager is an effective and ruth-
less predator. Under such circumstances, a policy of always firing the manager when entry occurs
could be counterproductive.
2000]
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firms in my sample were, contrary to the charges, not engaging in
predation; or, that if predation was occurring, it cannot be ex-
plained by theories which rely on firms hiring nonprofit maxi-
mizing managers (p 25).
Lott's caution is well advised and commendable.
In addition to having these general conceptual difficulties, Lott's
empirical analysis may be constrained in its explanatory power by
several more technical concerns that we now address.
1. Empirical analysis of predation and
managerial compensation.
If successful predatory pricing requires a firm to sacrifice profit,
reasons Lott, then CEO compensation should be inversely related to
profit in firms that are accused of predatory pricing (p 40). Contrary
to that hypothesis, Lott stresses the finding that firms accused of
predatory pricing tend to link CEO compensation positively to short-
term profit more than other firms do (p 43). He interprets this pattern
as evidence that the accused firms do not reward the CEO for the
profit sacrifice that is a prerequisite to predatory pricing. That inter-
pretation, however, is open to debate on several grounds.
First, Lott's (largely unstated) theoretical model appears to
equate managers and CEOs. If lower-level managers are the ones who
actually carry out predation, then one would want to examine the rela-
tionship between alleged predation and the compensation of
lower-level managers. Lott concedes this point (p 139 n 23), but notes
that data limitations preclude such an analysis.
A second issue concerns the proper measure of managerial com-
pensation. A large literature notes the difficulties in inferring true
compensation from available data.24 Available data seldom capture
such important elements of compensation as vacation time, retirement
benefits, staff support, perquisites, working conditions, travel require-
ments, scheduling flexibility, and so forth. Lott acknowledges this point
(p 39) but (perhaps appropriately) concludes that, since others have
proceeded with less than ideal data, he will also. The use of stock op-
tions for managerial compensation complicates matters further. It is
not clear that "stock options exercised ... during the previous year"
should be included in any measure of compensation (p 31). Exercised
options reflect discretionary behavior by the employee, and may not
' For two recent reviews of the literature, see Joel S. Denski and David E.M. Sappington,
Summarization With Errors: A Perspective on Empirical Investigations of Agency Relationships,
10 Mgmt Accounting Research 21 (1999); Canice Prendergast, The Provision of Incentives in
Firms, 37 J Econ Lit 7 (1999).
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be deliberate attempts by the firm to motivate desired actions. 2 (Lott,
however, indicates in a footnote (p 139 n 19) that the empirical find-
ings do not vary when this component of compensation is omitted.)
Furthermore, Lott's 0-1 dummy variable that reflects whether the firm
provides options to its CEOs is less than satisfactory. Ideally, one
would want a measure of the number of options provided and the
value of these options.
Third, managers terminate their employment at firms for many
reasons, including personal conflicts, health concerns, family consid-
erations, and alternative employment offers. When Lott regresses
measures of managerial turnover at a firm on indicators for whether
the firm predated and other variables, he fails to control for all rele-
vant factors that may explain turnover. This may produce omitted
variable bias2 rendering unreliable the estimated relationship between
managerial turnover and possible predatory activity. Also, greater
managerial turnover may be evidence of an industry in which there is
an active labor market for CEOs. In such markets, the internal mone-
tary incentives afforded a CEO may have relatively little impact on
his performance.
Apart from the preceding considerations, there are at least three
reasons why managerial compensation may increase as short-term
profit increases in firms that are engaged in predation. First, aggres-
sive, risk-loving managers who may be particularly adept at conduct-
ing predatory pricing may be attracted to firms that link pay more
closely to performance. Thus, the identified pay structure may serve to
attract the desired type of CEO. Second, CEOs direct many different
aspects of firms' activities. Although predation might be encouraged
by increasing compensation as short-term profit falls, other activities
(cost reduction and innovation, for example) may suffer from such a
reward structure. It is important to recognize explicitly the multi-task
nature of firms.2' Third, firms that seem to be engaged in predation
may be under the most pronounced pressure from competitors. If so, it
may be particularly critical for these firms to induce their managers to
It is conceivable that the number of options exercised could provide relevant information
about predatory behavior. Managers at time t, who know the firm will adopt a predatory pricing
strategy at time t+2, might exercise options at time t and sell at time t+1 to avoid the dip at time
t+2. However, insider trading laws may prevent this strategy and strip the options exercised of
their information value.
See William H. Greene, Econometric Analysis 401-02 (Prentice-Hall 3d ed 1993).
See Bengt Holmstrom and Paul Milgrom, Multi-Task Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive
Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design,7 J L, Econ, & Org 24 (1991) (arguing that principal-
agent models are of limited use in analyzing firms' compensation policies unless they can ac-
count for those firms' multiple goals and developing a model that does account for multiple
goals).
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rectify immediately the decline in profit that intense competition has
caused.
In short, the link between CEO compensation and short-term
profit in firms accused of predation is not necessarily evidence of
predatory behavior or the lack thereof
2. Sample size and interpretation.
Lott's cautions regarding the size of his sample are important (p
36). Lott is testing for significant differences between the activities of
firms accused of predation and those not so accused. Even if economi-
cally meaningful differences are present, they may not manifest them-
selves as statistically significant, given the small number of firms ac-
cused of predation.7
Moreover, Lott's interpretation of the likely effects of his inde-
pendent variables is not beyond question. Three examples illustrate
this point. First, Lott regards the industry-adjusted Tobin's q'2 as a
"proxy for management entrenchment" because, "[tio the extent that
poorly managed firms have a low q, then q provides a possible meas-
ure of the value created by a takeover" (p 24). However, despite some
supporting empirical evidence that Lott curiously does not cite, 3 it is
not clear that a firm with a high Tobin's q is less vulnerable to take-
overs (p 24). A high value of Tobin's q may alternatively signal an un-
usually attractive opportunity for further enhancements of a firm's
operations, and therefore a relatively high likelihood of takeover. An
internet company, for example, might have both a high q and a high
likelihood of being acquired. Second, Lott suggests that research and
development expenditure is also an indicator of management en-
trenchment because it is "more costly to remove managers who have
large specific human capital investments in evaluating research" (p
24). Yet firms that are actively engaged in research and development
may also be particularly likely takeover targets (in order to internalize
Moreover, models in the literature suggest that only cases in which the guilt of the defen-
dant is assessed incorrectly proceed to trial. The other cases are settled. See Andrew E Daughety,
Settlement, in B. Bouckaert and Gerrit De Geest, eds, Encyclopedia of Law and Economics part 7
(Edward Elgar 1998), available online at <http://www.encyclo.findlaw. com/lit/7400art.htm> (vis-
ited Nov 2,1999) (surveying recent models). The point that Lott raises (p 31) may therefore war-
rant more consideration than he affords it.
Tobin's q is the ratio of a firm's market value to the replacement cost of its assets. See, for
example, Ross, Westerfield, and Jaffe, Corporate Finance at 37-38 (cited in note 1).
Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny, Value Maximization and the Acquisition Process, 2
J Econ Persp 7,11,12 (1988) (describing studies which found that a firm's Tobin's q score helped
predict whether it would be the victim of a hostile takeover). See also Andrei ShIeifer and Rob-
ert W. Vishny, Management Entrenchment: The Case of Manager-Specific Investments, 25 J Fm
Econ 123, 134-36 (1989) (explaining why managers' efforts to entrench themselves might pro-
duce a low Tobin's q in a firm).
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the spillovers from innovation, for example). Third, Lott claims that
large firms are a proxy for entrenchment because large firms are more
difficult to take over (p 24). However, firms may be large because they
control particularly valuable resources, an attribute that actually
makes them more attractive takeover targets. The actual or an-
nounced acquisition of companies the size of Ameritech, GTE, Mobil,
Sprint, and Telecom Italia in 1999 gives reason to doubt Lott's hy-
pothesis. As these three examples suggest, not only is Lott's focus on
entrenchment questionable (which relates as well to his interpretation
of the Milgrom-Roberts model), but so are his proxies for entrench-
ment.
C. Lott's Analysis of How the Would-Be Victim of Predation Might
Benefit from Privileged Information
In Chapter 5, Lott introduces an intriguing argument to the pre-
dation debate that merits further thought. He asks whether "potential
entrants [can] make money using information on their decision to en-
ter a market with a predatory firm" and whether "these entrants [can]
use the predatory firm's commitment to lose money to increase the re-
turns to entry" (p 17). The specific mechanism by which the entrant
would exploit this asymmetry of information would be through its
short selling of the predator's stock. If an entrant knew that an incum-
bent firm would engage in predation upon the entrant's entry into an
industry, the entrant could sell short the stock of the incumbent. Since,
in the short-run, the incumbent's predation will cost it profits, the in-
cumbent's stock price will likely fall. The entrant will then be able to
offset its own loss in sales or profits due to the incumbent's predation
by gains from having sold short the incumbent's shares. This line of
analysis builds on Lott's work with Robert Hansen,'M and the two de-
serve credit for introducing an interesting line of inquiry.
The analysis in Chapter 5, however, illustrates forcefully the more
general criticism that Lott does not spell out the details of his formal
model carefully (details that elude the reader even after close study of
the analysis in Appendix C, which includes confusing typographical
errors and/or undefined terms). In particular, the equilibrium concept
" Lott and Hansen's earlier work explained the welfare effects that followed when share
purchases linked the financial fortunes of competitors. See Robert G. Hansen and John R. Lott,
Jr., Externalities and Corporate Objectives in a World with Diversified Shareholder/Consumers, 31
J Fim & Quantitative Anal 43 (1996) (suggesting that investors who owned diversified portfolios
might disapprove of policies that were profit maximizing but imposed costs on other firms);
Robert G. Hansen and John R. Lott, Jr., Profiting from Induced Changes in Competitors' Market
Values: The Case of Entry and Entry Deterrence, 43 J Indus Econ 261 (1995) (proposing a model
to examine "how one firm might profit by trading in the securities of other firms whose values
are dependent on the first firm's actions").
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being employed is not specified.n Lott defines FC* to be "the critical
cost level that the market assumes the entrant to be using" (p 127). It
is not clear, however, who "the market" is, or how it obtains these be-
liefs. Presumably these beliefs are correct in equilibrium. But how are
beliefs affected by out-of-equilibrium actions by the entrant and/or
the incumbent? These are the critical issues that lie at the heart of a
vast literature on signaling and equilibrium refinements.3 It is difficult
to assess Lott's conclusions when he does not provide a more com-
plete treatment of these issues. For example, in a footnote, Lott states
his assumption that "the potential entrant makes a public announce-
ment concerning its plans, and that this announcement is credible" (p
153 n 25). The assumption that any statement by the entrant is credi-
ble warrants considerably more justification, and is particularly incon-
gruous given the book's focus on the difficulties associated with mak-
ing announcements and actions credible.
Despite these shortcomings, Lott's conjectures on predation and
short selling are likely to stimulate further productive research. It
would be useful, for example, to develop a careful welfare analysis of
the short selling of competitors' stock. Short selling by the potential
victim of predation may make the victim more aggressive. This can be
advantageous in settings where too little entry would arise in the ab-
sence of short selling. (But if, as Lott seems to suggest, predatory
pricing does not take place, and if nonprice predation also does not
occur, then is there ever too little entry in equilibrium?) However,
more aggressive entrants can reduce social welfare in settings where
there is excessive entry even without short selling. Gregory Mankiw
and Michael Whinston suggest that this is often the case because an
entrant does not internalize the loss in sales that it imposes on com-
petitors when it enters.4
A complete analysis of the merits of short selling should also in-
clude the possibility of buyouts, which Lott's stories suggest may be
important in practice. There is some theoretical work on this issue,4
That is, no precise definition of an equilibrium is offered. Typically, "an equilibrium is a
situation in which each individual agent is doing as well as it can for itself given the array of ac-
tions taken by others and given the institutional framework that defines the options of individu-
als and links their actions." David M. Kreps, A Course in Microeconomic Theory 6 (Princeton
1990).
For an overview, see Andreu Mas-Colell, Michael D. Whinston, and Jerry R. Green, Micro-
economic Theory (Oxford 1995); Drew Fudenberg and Jean Tirole, Game Theory 324-29,446-60
(MIT 1991). For a less technical treatment, see Eric Rasmusen, Games and Information: An In-
troduction to Game Theory (Blackwell 2d ed 1994).
N. Gregory Mankiw and Michael D. Whinston, Free Entry and Social Inefficiency, 17
RAND J Econ 48 (1986).
See, for example, Eric Rasmusen, Entry for Buyout, 36 J Indus Econ 281 (1988) (exploring
the possibility that firms may enter an oligopolistic or monopolistic market in hopes of being
bought out).
[67:271
Credible Predators
but the work to date has not considered short selling. Although Han-
sen's and Lott's original work predates related work by other authors,
there is some scholarship that deserves mention. For example, the re-
cent work of Jeremy Bulow, Ming Huang, and Paul Klemperer on toe-
hold acquisitions examines takeovers in which one of the bidders al-
ready owns a (small) stake in the target firm.3 Because it owns a stake
in the target, the acquirer gains when the final acquisition price is
high, regardless of the identity of the winning bidder' Consequently,
the bidder with the toehold stake bids more aggressively than it would
without the toehold stake. Its aggressive bidding induces others to bid
more aggressively in equilibrium, leading to a higher acquisition price.
Bulow, Huang, and Klemperer note that this effect can be sufficiently
strong that the target firm may benefit by voluntarily providing a po-
tential acquirer some shares in the target (at no cost). Although Bu-
low, Huang, and Klemperer do not consider predatory pricing, some of
the basic incentive effects in the two analyses appear to be similar.
Lott (or a future researcher) might benefit from adopting some of the
methodology of Bulow, Huang, and Klemperer in providing a more
detailed investigation of the welfare implications of linking the finan-
cial fortunes of competitors.
II. PREDATION BY PUBLIC ENTERPRISES
Until Lott's writings on predation by public enterprises,7 an un-
stated premise in the debate over predatory pricing had been that
predators were privately owned firms seeking to maximize profit.
Profit-maximizing firms will undertake predatory pricing only if doing
so increases long-term profit. Public enterprises, which typically do not
seek to maximize long-term profit, were rarely the subject of research
on predatory pricing. Looking past this assumption, Lott pointed out
that public enterprises often compete with private firms, and asked
whether public enterprises have an incentive to engage in predatory
pricing when private firms would not.
The question is of considerable importance. Even in so capitalist
an economy as that in the United States, public enterprises account for
the production of goods and services valued annually in the hundreds
of billions of dollars. Public enterprises operated by, or under the aus-
pices oft the federal government include the U.S. Postal Service, the
Tennessee Valley Authority, the Bonneville Power Authority, the Salt
River Project, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Amtrak, and UNICOR (Fed-
eral Prison Industries). The annual revenues of the U.S. Postal Service
Jeremy Bulow, Ming Huang, and Paul Klemperer, Toeholds and Takeovers, 107 J Pol Econ
427 (1999).
John R. Lott, Jr., Predation by Public Enterprises, 43 J Pub Econ 237 (1990).
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alone exceed $60 billion.n In many cases, these public enterprises may
compete with private firms in the supply of some services while en-
joying a statutory monopoly over the supply of others, as in the case of
the Private Express Statutes, which grant the U.S. Postal Service a mo-
nopoly over the delivery of letters.9 Public enterprises often account
for even larger portions of economic activity in other countries, and a
central element in the process of commercializing or privatizing those
enterprises is to remove their statutory privileges and immunities, in-
cluding protection from competition.40
Perhaps because of the global trend toward privatization, the
competitive implications of public enterprises are generating in-
creased, widespread attention. In the spring and summer of 1999
alone, for example, the European Commission commenced separate
investigations of possibly anticompetitive behavior by Deutsche Post,
France Television, and Italy's RAI;4' a private delivery company in
Calgary challenged Canada Post's statutory monopoly as a violation
of Alberta's provincial rights under Canadian constitutional principles
of federalism;4, the British government commenced an investigation of
the British Broadcasting Company's offer of free Internet access;3 and
the U.S. Postal Service came under fire for adopting regulations re-
quiring customers of private mailbox services such as Mail Boxes Etc.
to register their actual addresses with the Postal Service and have
their incoming mail addressed "PMB" for private mailbox, lest it be
marked "Undeliverable as Addressed" and returned to the sender.4
United States Postal Service, Comprehensive Statement on Postal Operations, FY 1998
(1999), available online at <http'J/www.usps.gov/historylanrpt98> (visited Nov 2, 1999). At the
state and local-level, public enterprises include electrical cooperatives, municipally owned elec-
tric companies, roads, bridges, tunnels, bus and rail transit systems, water and sewer systems,
waste removal services, hospitals, schools, airports, and ports.
18 USC §§ 1694 et seq (1994 & Supp 1995). See also . Gregory Sidak and Daniel F Spul-
ber, Protecting Competition from the Postal Monopoly 11-38 (AEI 1996) (analyzing Private Ex-
press Statutes).
For example, Australia subjected its state-owned telephone company, Telstra, to the anti-
trust laws even before the flotation of the first tranche of the company's privatization. Sidak and
Spulber, Protecting Competition from the Postal Monopoly at 157-58 (cited in note 39).
4 William Echikson, A Trustbuster's Parting Volley, Bus Wk 21 (Aug 9, 1999); Dominant
Mail, Economist 62 (July 24,1999); Emma lucker, Brussels to Probe Post and Broadcasting, Fin
Tunes 2 (July 20,1999); Emma Tucker and Ralph Atkins, Deutsche Post Ready to Argue Its Case,
Fm Tunes 2 (July 20,1999). In February 1999, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development ("OECD") held a conference of antitrust enforcers from its member nations to
address competition issues in postal services. See Promoting Competition in Postal Services
(OECD 1999).
Counterclaim, Canada Post Corp v Goodfellas Delivery Inc, Action No 9901-05495 (Ct of
Queen's Bench of Alberta, Jud Dist Calgary, filed May 7,1999). For a treatment of this subject,
see J. Gregory Sidak and Daniel F Spulber, Monopoly and the Mandate of Canada Post, 14 Yale J
Reg 1 (1997) (evaluating the existing position of Canada Post and proposing reforms).
BBC Launches Free Internet Service, Wall St J A6 (Sept 3,1999).
Michael Brick, Private Mailbox Services Call New Postal Rules Unfair, NY Tunes C2 (July
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A. Incentives for Predation by Public Enterprises
Lott argues that the standard objections to predation theories do
not apply to public enterprises because such firms have different in-
centives than private firms to undertake predation. He cites a number
of reasons why that might be so. First, Lott argues that public enter-
prises benefit from a lack of benchmarking that facilitates monitoring
private firms engaged in predatory conduct (p 67). Second, Lott ar-
gues that the manager of a public enterprise need not convince would-
be competitors that he or she is willing to sacrifice profit, but merely
that the manager "obtain[s] benefits from selling the product at the
predatory price" (p 67). Third, Lott argues that "by eliminating private
competitors, public enterprises may reduce the political opposition to
their receiving increased subsidies," which may enable public enter-
prises to have "lower prices and expanded output" (p 68). Fourth, Lott
argues that, because antitrust laws do not apply to public enterprises,
the public predator can acquire the assets of its victim after a success-
ful round of predatory pricing and thus keep those assets from falling
into the hands of an entirely new entrant (p 71).
Lott's list, while useful, neglects powerful institutional details
concerning public enterprises that may provide other reasons why
public enterprises have stronger incentives to engage in predation
than private firms. First, a public enterprise typically has a statutory
duty to pursue objectives other than profit maximization. The U.S.
Postal Service, for example, is required by statute to consider the fair-
ness, equity, and simplicity of its rate structure as well as the relation-
ships among prices, production costs, and the value of the service pro-
vided.4 5 These deviations from profit maximization seem only natural
for an enterprise that is not privately owned. Why would it be consid-
ered necessary to create a public enterprise in the first place if its
mandate were to copy exactly what a private firm does? In the
American economy, where public ownership of enterprise has been
the exception rather than the rule, the very decision to create a public
enterprise thus suggests an attempt by government to address some
form of market failure (or, perhaps, income redistribution). For exam-
ple, Oliver Hart, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny have theorized
that public production is desirable when it is inherently difficult to
write contractual provisions concerning an important element of
service (such as quality).4 William J. Baumol has argued that public
production may be necessary to dull incentives that otherwise might
6,1999).
39 USC § 3622 (1994 & Supp 1998).
Oliver Hart, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny, The Proper Scope of Government:
Theory and an Application to Prisons, 112 Q J Econ 1127,1131-44 (1997).
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produce excessive levels of the output in question. For example, if po-
lice were rewarded according to arrests, they might arrest too often. If
such output-based compensation is more likely to occur in private
firms than in public ones, then reliance on public enterprises may
avoid this kind of moral hazard.47
Second, unlike the private firm that may find it impossible to re-
pel subsequent entry, public enterprises are often multiproduct firms
that benefit from statutory monopolies over related products or serv-
ices. Indeed, the U.S. Postal Service even claims to have the discretion
to interpret the contours of its own statutory monopoly." Thus, the
Postal Service enjoys the ability to raise entry costs for private firms
by defining the scope of competitive services that may be privately
supplied.
Third, the public enterprise may enjoy privileges and immunities
that facilitate recoupment of predatory losses or make them irrele-
vant. The U.S. Postal Service, for example, has no obligation to com-
pensate its investors, the American taxpayers.4 9 The absence of an ob-
ligation to pay a return of, or on, invested capital lowers the opportu-
nity cost of funds that a public enterprise may use to subsidize preda-
tory losses. Similarly, the Postal Service has the ability to carry forward
losses into the ratemaking process.2 In addition, the Postal Service is
exempt from taxation,1 which in effect lowers its cost of capital.
Fourth, the public enterprise may be subject to less binding price
regulation than typical private firms subject to public utility commis-
sion regulations. The Postal Rate Commission, for example, lacks sub-
poena power and has limited powers to set maximum prices for postal
services.'
B. Empirical Analysis of Dumping Cases as Evidence of the Greater
Propensity of Public Enterprises to Attempt Predation
In Chapter 4 of Are Predatory Commitments Credible?, Lott at-
tempts to determine empirically whether predatory pricing by public
enterprises is more likely than predatory pricing by private firms. He
does so by "comparing the relative frequencies with which charges of
' William J. Baumol, Toward a Theory of Public Enterprise, 12 Atlantic Econ J 13,17 (1984);
Henry B. Hansmann, The Ownership of Enterprise 227-45 (Belknap 1996) (suggesting a possible
role for nonprofit firms, public or private, when consumers have poor information about product
quality).
Sidak and Spulber, Protecting Competition from the Postal Monopoly at 18-19, 26-31
(cited in note 39).
Id at2,88.
Id at 116.
Id at2.
39 USC §§ 3601 et seq (1994 & Supp 1998); Sidak and Spulber, Protecting Competition
from the Postal Monopoly at 84-87,159-60 (cited in note 39).
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below-cost pricing are brought against private and government enter-
prises" (p 74). Thus, Lott seeks to draw inferences about the plausibil-
ity of predatory pricing by public enterprises by analyzing reported
dumping cases in the United States, EEC, Canada, Australia, and Fin-
land. Again, while clever, Lott's empirical work is nonetheless not de-
finitive. There are a number of potential problems with his analysis.
First, it is not clear that antidumping statutes proscribe, and that
Lott measures, the kind of conduct that economists describe as preda-
tory pricing. Lott states that dumping involves "exporting at prices
'below normal value"' (p 75). But what relation does "value" bear to
"cost"? Several pages later, Lott states that "the below-cost definition
of dumping under international trade law closely accords with the
concept of predation" (p 78). That statement is doubtful at least in the
United States, where the purpose of even the closest antidumping
statute fitting this description, the Antidumping Act of 1916,"3 is the
subject of judicial and scholarly dispute as to whether it more closely
resembles a predatory pricing rule or a price discrimination rule akin
to the Robinson-Patman Act." The Antidumping Act of 1921," which
was incorporated into the Tariff Act of 1930, did not require a showing
that imports had been sold below cost. As amended and recodified,
that statute instead turns on whether pricing "at less than fair value"
has occurred and whether such pricing has caused or threatened "ma-
terial injury" to an American industry. Lott mentions that interna-
tional regimes such as "GATT use[ ] a long-run average cost criteri-
on" (p 145 n 10).f That criterion, however, is likely to be very distinct
" 15 USC §§ 71-74 (1994).
15 USC §§ 13a, 13b, 21a (1994). Compare Geneva Steel v Ranger Steel, 980 F Supp 1209,
1225 (D Utah 1997) (arguing that the plain language of the 1916 Antidumping Act clearly states
a protectionist purpose), and Note, Rethinking the 1916 Antidumping Act, 110 Harv L Rev 1555
(1997) (arguing that "the Act's focus [is] on protecting U.S. industry-the traditional goal of
trade law-rather than on maximizing efficiency and consumer welfare"), with J. Gregory Sidak,
A Framework for Administering the 1916 Antidumping Act: Lessons from Antitrust Economics,
18 Stan J Intl L 377,380-90 (1982) (arguing that Congress intended that Act to "proscribe only
international predatory pricing").
" 19 USC § 160 (1947), repealed by Trade Agreements Act of 1979 § 106(a), Pub L No 96-
39,93 Stat 144,193.
Trade Agreements Act of 1979,93 Stat 144,162, codified at 19 USC §§ 1671 et seq (1994 &
Supp 1995). A claim that a good has been sold at less than "fair value" can be made either by
showing that the good was sold in the target country at less than its cost of production, or that it
was sold in the target country for less than it was sold for in the exporting country (price dis-
crimination). For a full discussion of antidumping claim standards, see William H. Lash, III, US
International Trade Regulation: A Primer 23-47 (AEI 1998); Brian Hindley and Patrick A.
Messerlin, Antidumping Industrial Policy: Legalized Protectionism in the WTO and What to Do
about It 6-26 (AEI 1996).
GATT only defines dumping as selling a good for "less than the normal value," and
thereby "caus[ing] or threaten[ing] material injury to an established industry." General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade, Art VI § 1 (1994). To show that a good has been sold for less than
normal value, a plaintiff may either show that it was sold (i) for less than its fair market value in
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in practice from marginal cost or short-run average variable cost,
which is the standard advocated by Areeda and Turner for antitrust
cases and generally employed by U.S. courts to assess whether preda-
tion has occurred." In theory and practice, a long-run average cost
standard can differ significantly from a short-run average cost stan-
dard. In economics, the long run is defined by the period of time over
which all factors of production, including capital, are variable. In
other words, capital costs are assumed to be fixed in the short run and
thus do not enter short-run variable costs. Consequently, it is not clear
that by focusing on dumping cases Lott is measuring actual incidents
of predatory pricing in his sample.
Second, Lott claims that the mandate to "fulfill production tar-
gets" is "consistent with output-maximizing behavior" (p 76). True,
but it is also consistent with other behavior. If the government in-
structs firms to produce less output than their technology permits, it is
not clear that output is being maximized in any sense. Indeed, a de-
fining feature of many nonmarket economies is the fact that prices do
not adjust to equate supply and demand. Therefore, production sur-
pluses or deficits are more likely at any given point in time for state-
controlled firms than for market-driven firms (where price adjust-
ments serve to reduce imbalances). Consequently, it should not be
surprising that state-controlled firms will periodically have production
surpluses that they cannot sell in domestic markets, and so attempt to
sell them in foreign markets. It seems possible that Lott's empirical
findings reflect this phenomenon rather than any natural tendency for
public enterprises to price below cost more than their profit-
maximizing counterparts.
Third, nonmarket economies may provide limited domestic com-
petition. Public ownership and monopoly are often found together.60
the home country, (ii) for less than the fair market price in a third country (price discrimination),
or (iii) for less than the cost of production in the exporting country (p 124).
Areeda and 'irner, 88 Harv L Rev at 712 n 37 (cited in note 3) (proposing the marginal
cost or short-run average variable cost standard in antitrust cases). For representative applica-
tions of, or variations on, the Areeda-Turmer test, see Kelco Disposa4 Inc v Browning-Ferris In-
dustries, 845 F2d 404,407 (2d Cir 1988) ("Prices [ ] below reasonably anticipated marginal cost,
and its surrogate, reasonably anticipated average variable cost ... are presumed predatory."),
affd, Browning-Ferris Industries v Kelco Disposal, Inc, 492 US 257 (1989); International Air In-
dustries v American Excelsior Co, 517 F2d 714,723-24 (5th Cir 1975) ("[W]e do not believe that
(a] monopolist's pricing behavior could be deemed anti-competitive unless the monopolist set a
price below its marginal cost."); William Inglis & Sons Baking Co v ITT Continental Baking Co,
668 F2d 1014,1032-38 (9th Cir 1981) ("If... the plaintiff proves that the defendant's prices were
below average variable cost, the plaintiff has established a prima facie case of predatory pric-
ing.").
" See, for example, Paul A. Samuelson and William D. Nordhaus, Economics 98 (McGraw-
Hill 15th ed 1995).
John Vickers and George Yarrow, Privatization: An Economic Analysis 45-46 (M1T 1988)
(arguing that publicly owned companies often face no significant competition).
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The limited competition may facilitate price discrimination, with high
domestic prices and low prices on foreign markets. Such price dis-
crimination would be profitable for profit-maximizing firms as well as
for government enterprises.
Fourth, Lott is not able to control adequately for the trade barri-
ers that particular countries impose. One reason to challenge a coun-
try in a world court may be to obtain concessions (as part of an infor-
mal settlement, perhaps) on trade barriers. If (generally) nonmarket
countries erect higher trade barriers, then their pricing practices may
be challenged in a world court more often, even though they are not
engaged in any more predatory pricing than are market-oriented
countries.
Fifth, formal challenges in world courts may be a last resort that
is pursued only if all other forms of negotiation break down. If mar-
ket-oriented countries have established better negotiation channels
and use these channels more effectively than their nonmarket coun-
terparts, then formal challenges of the former's pricing practices may
be observed less frequently.
This partial list of problems suggests the difficulty in using
dumping cases to test the plausibility of predation by public enterpris-
es. Lott seems to recognize the shortcomings of the data that he em-
ploys, yet he decides to proceed anyway. Some might view that ap-
proach as hopelessly flawed. We incline toward a less critical, longer-
term view. Lott deserves credit for undertaking an initial empirical
analysis of important, interesting issues. He identifies some initial em-
pirical regularities that merit close examination, and he also provides
a framework on which other research can build.
III. AN AGENDA FOR RESEARCH ON THE ANTICOMPETITIVE
BEHAVIOR OF PUBLIC ENTERPRISES
The plausibility of predation by public enterprises justifies careful
examination of several fundamental questions by legislators, courts,
regulators, and scholars. One set of questions concerns the conditions
under which anticompetitive behavior by public enterprises might
arise. A second set of questions concerns the proper policy response to
predation by public enterprises and the implications of such predation
for the role of public enterprises in a capitalist society. We consider
each set of questions in turn.
A. Toward a More Complete Theory of Anticompetitive Behavior
by Public Enterprises
Are Predatory Commitments Credible? is a valuable starting point
for the development of a theory of anticompetitive behavior by public
2000]
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enterprises, but much work remains to be done by scholars in law and
economics. Lott, for example, does not provide a framework for ana-
lyzing firms that simultaneously pursue a mixture of profit maximiza-
tion and other non-profit-maximizing objectives. Nor does his analysis
extend beyond predatory pricing to other forms of behavior, such as
raising the operating costs of existing rivals, erecting entry barriers to
preclude the operation of new competitors, and circumventing regula-
tions designed to foster competition.
In a recent working paper, we examine the incentives that public
enterprises may have to undertake anticompetitive activities.' Our
analysis extends Lott's observation that public enterprises may set
prices below marginal production costs and thereby harm competition
and reduce welfare. We model formally the public enterprise's con-
cern with both profit and its operating scale. The critical assumption in
our analysis is that the public enterprise values expanded output more
highly than does its profit-maximizing counterpart. We are able to ex-
tend Lott's analysis by specifying precisely when a public enterprise
will price below marginal cost and how the prices that a public enter-
prise sets vary as its concern with profit varies. We find that public en-
terprises often have stronger incentives to pursue anticompetitive ac-
tivities than do their private, profit-maximizing counterparts. Quite of-
ten, the less concerned the public enterprise is with profit, the stronger
are its incentives to undertake activities that disadvantage competi-
tors. Our analysis supports Lott's observation that a public enterprise
might set the price of a product below its marginal cost of production.
We find that below-cost pricing is most likely when the public enter-
prise's focus on profit is limited and when the demand for the public
enterprise's product is elastic. We also find that a public enterprise
typically has stronger incentives than a profit-maximizing firm to de-
vote resources to relaxing a binding prohibition against below-cost
pricing.
B. The Legal and Policy Implications of Anticompetitive Behavior
by Public Enterprises
As a matter of sound policy formulation, it is necessary to de-
velop a coherent understanding of why government creates public en-
terprises that compete against private firms. For any given public en-
terprise, we should ask a series of questions. What is its reason for ex-
David E.M. Sappington and J. Gregory Sidak, Incentives for Anticompetitive Behavior by
Public Enterprises, AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies, Working Paper 99-11
(AEI November 1999), available online at <http://www.aei.brookings.orglpublications/workingl
working_99_Jl.pdf> (visited on Jan 8,2000).
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istence?c Has its current mission deviated from the original statutory
mandate? What do the managers of the public enterprise actually
maximize? What privileges and immunities does the enterprise enjoy,
and how congruent are those benefits with the mandates of the public
enterprise? At present, the legal and economic analysis of public en-
terprises does not provide fully satisfactory answers to these ques-
tions.
The optimal design of regulatory policy for public enterprises also
has received little attention in the literature and deserves careful
study. It is important to determine, for example, whether the benefits
that price-cap regulations provide when applied to profit-maximizing
firms persist when price-cap regulations are applied to public enter-
prises. The driving force that produces consumer benefits when price-
caps are applied to a privately owned firm-the firm's incentive to
minimize costs in order to increase profits-may be less pronounced
when price-caps are applied to public enterprises. One therefore
would not expect public enterprises to respond in the same manner as
privately-owned utilities to the economic incentives that price-caps
present. It is conceivable, for example, that public enterprises might
have greater incentives than their private counterparts to set prices• 63
strategically in order to relax binding price-cap constraints, or to em-
ploy the expanded freedoms of price-cap regulations to price below
marginal cost.A
The optimal design of antitrust law as applied to public enter-
prises also merits extensive study. We have shown that a public enter-
prise may have greater incentive to engage in anticompetitive prac-
tices and circumvent antitrust laws than its private counterpart.
Heightened antitrust scrutiny would therefore seem to be appropriate
for the pricing decisions of public enterprises. It may be more appro-
priate for courts to permit more liberal discovery of facts relevant to
predation and more readily allow claims of predatory pricing to ad-
vance to trial when such suits are brought against public enterprises.
In addition, it is conceivable that courts should be more willing to
grant preliminary injunctions to halt allegedly anticompetitive con-
duct by public enterprises than by private enterprises, since success on
the merits is more likely in cases against public entities. For similar
See notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
For models of incentives created by price-cap regulation in the telecommunications indus-
try, see Peter Law, Welfare Effects of Pricing in Anticipation of Laspeyres Price Cap Regulation:
An Example, 49 Bull Econ Research 17 (1997); R. Dean Foreman, Pricing Incentives Under
Price-Cap Regulation, 7 Information Econ & Pol 331 (1995); David E.M. Sappington and David
S. Sibley, Strategic Nonlinear Pricing Under Price-Cap Regulation, 23 RAND J Econ 1, 3-9
(1992).
. Mark Armstrong and John Vickers, Price Discrimination, Competition and Regulation, 41 J
Indus Econ 335,349-53 (1993).
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reasons, more stringent antitrust penalties may be appropriate for
public enterprises. Of course, financial penalties may have little force
if the public enterprise is able to pass those penalties on to citizens in
the form of higher prices. More fundamentally, antitrust enforcement
of any kind against public enterprises would raise the antecedent
question of the proper scope of sovereign immunity for the proprie-
tary, as opposed to political, actions of governments.
Yet another set of issues concerns judicial review: should a court
grant Chevron deference to a public enterprise's interpretation of its
own competitive privileges and immunities? As noted earlier, the
United States Postal Service claims to have the discretion to interpret
the boundaries of its own monopoly by virtue of its rulemaking
authority regarding the definition of a letter.' The commercial motiva-
tions of the Postal Service may compromise its impartiality when de-
fining a letter (including an "extremely urgent" letter). Thus, a legiti-
mate question that arises is whether a reviewing court should defer,
under Chevron or similar precedents, to the Postal Service's interpre-
tations of postal statutes that bear upon its statutory privileges and
immunities.
CONCLUSION
An increasingly frequent theme sounded in competition policy
throughout the world's developed economies is that public enterprises
are engaged in anticompetitive behavior aimed at private enterprises.
Are Predatory Commitments Credible? thus arrives on the scene at a
propitious moment. One major contribution of Lott's book is to un-
derscore the importance of long-run profit maximization as an as-
sumption in the analysis of predatory pricing. When one drops that as-
sumption, as should be done in the case of a public enterprise, the
plausibility of predation grows and presents a paradox: the firms that
may most deserve the government's scrutiny with respect to predation
are the government's own enterprises.
See note 48 and accompanying text.
